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Abstract 
Now-a-days people are more habitual of using portable devices like laptops, mobile phones, mp3 players etc. 
The Ad hoc networking allows communication between these devices without any central administration. But 
this flexibility is threatened by various security issues. To overcome this we need the robust security solution. In 
order  to  meet  this  requirement,  we  have  first  focused  on  various  network  attacks  for  which  MANET  is 
vulnerable. Later we have discussed many security goals related to MANET. Finally we emphasized on various 
security solutions. It also compares standard and secure routing protocol on the basis of security aspects. 
Keywords: AODV, MANET, Malicious Node, Network Attack, Trust Value. 
 
I.  Introduction 
Pervasive computing allows  the devices to 
be available anytime and anywhere. It is not possible 
to get wired network link between the two ubiquitous 
devices  every  time  and  everywhere.  Due  to  this 
reason  MANET,  the  mobile  ad  hoc  network  has 
grabbed the attention of many researchers which uses 
wireless  communication  technology.  e.g.  IEEE 
802.11 Wi-Fi. 
MANET  is  dynamically  self  organized 
mobile  network  with  lack  of  infrastructure  and 
central support. Using mobile ad hoc network, nodes 
can  directly  communicate  with  all  the  other  nodes 
within their radio ranges; whereas nodes that are not 
in the direct communication range use intermediate 
node(s) as routers to communicate with each other. 
The packets are forwarded from one source to one 
destination with the help of these intermediate nodes 
to create “multihop” paths. The routing protocols are 
supposed  to  find  such  multihop  paths.  Routing 
protocols  used  in  MANET  are:  DSDV,  OLSR, 
TBRPF, AODV, DSR, TORA, ZRP etc. The detail 
classification of these protocols is mention in section 
II. 
MANET  can  provide  information  and 
services all time and everywhere at any geographic 
position. It can be very easily deploy at any place and 
time  as  it  does  not  require  any  well  established 
infrastructure.  Because  of  these  magnificent 
distinctiveness MANET has many applications. 
In  adverse  geographic  conditions  and  locations 
MANET  can  establish  distributed  network  system 
without  any  base  stations.  MANET  has  no  central 
administrator or infrastructure. Due to this flexibility 
in the implementation of MANET it can be used in 
during natural calamities such as earthquake or flood 
like situations. It is used during emergency services, 
military or police operations. It plays important role 
in setting ad-hoc conferencing. 
Apart from these recompense MANET has 
few  confines  as  well.  Due  to  limited  resources  i.e. 
energy  supply,  limited  bandwidth  and  also  due  to 
mobility of nodes, it is difficult to establish wireless 
communication  link  between  two  nodes.  Due  to 
continuous  mobility  MANET  has  certain 
disadvantages  like  frequent  change  in  the  topology 
which  may  allow  any  compromised  node  to  join 
network  without  being  noticed.  Owing  to  open 
medium and intrinsic trust among the nodes it is very 
difficult to discriminate among normal and malicious 
node. All these limitations make MANET vulnerable 
to network attacks and its security issues become the 
prime area of concern. 
This  paper  focuses  on  security  issues  of 
MANET protocols. Our contribution in this paper is 
we  have  presented  the  detail  comparison  of  few 
traditional  routing  protocols  and  secure  routing 
protocols on the basis of security aspects. This paper 
is organized as follows: Section II gives classification 
routing  protocols  and  execution  of  few  traditional 
routing  protocols.  Section  III  gives  the  details  of 
various  attacks  of  MANET.  Section  IV  discusses 
security objectives of MANET. Section V provides 
the  literature  survey  available  on  various  secure 
routing  protocols.  The  detail  comparison  of  few 
traditional  routing  protocols  and  secure  routing 
protocols on the basis of security aspects is specified 
in  Section  VI.  Concluding  remark  is  the  part  of 
Section VII. 
 
II.  Traditional routing protocols 
Routing  protocols  are  classified  depending 
on many parameters like network structure, routing 
scheme, availability of information, latency, network 
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overhead  etc.  Depending  on  the  routing  scheme, 
MANET’s routing protocols are categorized as 
  Proactive 
  Reactive 
  Hybrid 
List  of  protocols  in  each  category  is  listed  in  the 
fig.1. 
 
Fig.1 Classification of Routing Protocols of MANET 
 
A. Reactive Protocol 
Reactive  protocol  is  also  known  as  source 
initiated  on-demand  routing  protocol.  In  this  type, 
route is discovered only when source node needs it. 
When  source  node  require  path  for  particular 
destination  it  searches  its  route  cache  for  the 
availability  of  path.  If  path  is  not  available  it 
performs route discovery. Route will be maintained 
by  route  maintenance  procedure  until  route  is  no 
longer  required  or  destination  is  not  approachable 
from all paths from source. Routing overhead is less 
in these protocols but it increases latency due to route 
discovery.  Latency  is  increased  due  to  every 
intermediate node involve in route discovery. These 
protocols  are  used  where  less  routing  overhead  is 
required. 
1.  AODV:  AODV  or  Ad-hoc  on  demand 
routing  protocol  is  the  reactive  protocol.  When 
source  need  to  send  message  to  the  destination  it 
searches its routing cache for route to destination. If 
route  does  not  found  it  initiates  route  discovery. 
AODV  supports  both  multicasting  and  unicasting 
routing.  AODV  uses  three  control  messages  while 
routing information within the network: 
Route Request Message (RREQ) 
Source initiates route discovery by sending 
RREQ  message to its neighbours. Neighbour sends 
RREQ  message  to  its  neighbour  likewise  it  uses 
expanding ring technique to reach to the destination. 
RREQ  message  contains  source  IP  address,  source 
sequence number, destination IP address, destination 
sequence number, hop count and broadcast ID. 
Route Reply Message (RREP) 
RREP message is generated in three cases: 
1. When node does not have path to the destination it 
generates RREP  message and sends to source. The 
elements  of  RREP  message  are  source  address, 
destination  address,  destination  sequence  number, 
hop count and lifetime. 
2. When intermediate node have destination sequence 
number higher than the destination sequence number 
in RREQ message then intermediate node generates 
RREP message and sends it. The elements of RREP 
message  are  source  address,  destination  address, 
destination sequence number, hop count and lifetime. 
3. When RREQ reaches to destination, it selects the 
shortest  path  from  all  received  RREQ  and  sends 
RREP  message  to  source  node.  The  elements  of 
RREP  message  are  destination  sequence  number, 
destination  ip  address,  originator  ip  address  and 
lifetime. 
Route Error Message (RERR) 
The  node  sends  RERR  message  to  its 
previous  node  from  which  it  has  received  RREQ 
message if it finds link to its next hop is broken. A 
node can also send RERR message if it received the 
data packet for the destination for which it does not 
have active path. 
Route Discovery in AODV 
 
Fig.2 Route Discovery Process in AODV 
 
Source node S initiates route discovery by 
sending RREQ message to its neighbour. By opting 
the ring expanding technique neighbour sends RREQ 
to its neighbour. Ultimately RREQ message reaches 
to the destination. As shown in fig. 2 the destination 
node  D  receives  three  RREQ  messages  each  from 
node E, node B and node G. Out of these, node D 
selects  the  shortest  path  i.e.  S-B-D  and  generates 
RREP  message  and  sends  to  source  node  S.  Each 
intermediate  node  processes  RREQ  message  either 
by  generating  RREP  message  or  by  rebroadcasting 
the RREQ message after incrementing hop count and 
by updating its routing table by storing the details of 
its previous node from which it has received RREQ 
message,  so  that,  it  can  be  used  in  reverse  path 
discovery.  The  intermediate  node  generates  RREP 
message  either  if  it  does  not  have  path  to  the 
destination or if it has greater destination sequence 
number. If node found broken link to its next hop it 
generates RERR message. 
Route Maintenance in AODV 
Each  node  maintains  the  lifetime  field  for 
each  row  in  its  routing  table.  If  route  is  not  used 
within that time then route is not considered as active 
route and gets deleted from the routing table entry of 
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2. DSR: Dynamic source routing or DSR is a reactive 
protocol. In this protocol intermediate node does not 
store routing information rather routing information 
is stored in routing cache. DSR route cache entries do 
not have lifetime entry. In DSR each node replies to 
every duplicate RREQ. Because of the source routing 
in DSR the size of the RREQ packet header grows as 
number  of  intermediate  nodes  increases.  DSR  has 
two main components: 
Route Discovery in DSR 
When  source  node  has  packet  to  send  to 
some  destination,  it  checks  its  route  cache  to  find 
whether  it  has  route  to  that  destination.  If  not,  it 
initiates route discovery by flooding RREQ message. 
Each intermediate node who receives RREQ message 
checks  whether  it  has  path  to  that  destination 
otherwise appends its own address to route record of 
request packet. If intermediate node has un-expired 
path to the destination in its route cache then it can 
also  generate  reply  message.  Finally  when  RREQ 
reaches to the destination it generates reply message. 
RREP message travels the route which is obtained by 
reversing the route appended to the RREQ message. 
When  source  node  has  data  packet  to  send  to  the 
destination, the entire path is included in the packet 
header. Intermediate nodes with the help of this path, 
decides to whom it has to forward the data packet. 
So, from fig. 3 source node S will use S-B-F-D path 
to send data packet to destination node D. 
 
Fig.3 Route Discovery in DSR 
 
Route Maintenance in DSR 
A node can transmit data packet, RREP or 
REER. It must cross check that it has been properly 
received by its neighbour i.e. its next hop. Otherwise 
node  should  generate  error  message  and  send  to 
source.  Source  should  initiate  the  route  discovery 
again. 
 
B. Proactive Protocol 
Proactive routing protocols are also called as 
table  driven  routing  protocols,  where  each  node 
maintains  the  routing  table.  This  routing  table  will 
have  information  from  every  node  to  every  other 
node.  Routing  information  is  propagated  by  every 
node  periodically  or  whenever  network  topology 
changes in order to maintain the consistent network 
view. Proactive protocols are not apposite for large 
network as it has to maintain large routing tables. As 
routing information is available in advance, node can 
find  best  path  to  destination,  hence  latency  is 
decreased. These protocols are used where minimal 
latency is required. 
1.  DSDV:  The  protocol  Destination 
Sequenced Distance Vector is abbreviated as DSDV. 
It is proactive protocol and works on Bellman-Ford 
algorithm.  Each  node  of  DSDV  maintains  routing 
table  which contains next hop, cost metric towards 
each destination a sequence number that is created by 
the destination itself. Each node lists all destinations 
and number of hops to those destinations. Each node 
knows  the  shortest  path  to  destination  in  advance. 
When node has significant new route information it 
transmits  that  information  to  its  neighbour  by 
monotonically increasing its sequence number so that 
it  should  be  even  number.  DSDV  support  periodic 
and triggered routing updates. If the link between the 
nodes is broken then it is designated as infinity. This 
protocol guarantees loop free paths. 
Working of DSDV 
Consider the following figure: 
 
Fig.4A DSDV Routing Update 
 
Consider  the  following  network  scenario: 
All  nodes  broadcast  with  sequence  number  1.Each 
node accept routing update from its neighbour. Thus 
from fig. 4A, for node A, distances to other nodes are 
node B=1, node C=1, node D = node E = ∞ 
When  node  D  sends  message  to  node  C,  then 
distances for node A will be 
node B=1, node C=1, node D = 2, node E = ∞ 
In the second round of forwarding from node C, node 
A will get new set of distances 
node B=1, node C=1, node D = 2, node E = 3 
Now  node  B  moves  to  the  new  position  in  the 
network  as  shown  in  fig.  4B.  Also  it  has  received 
new message from node E with sequence number 2. 
 
Fig.4B DSDV Routing Update 
 
Now node A has two distances for node E: 
Initial  one  with  distance  equal  to  3  and  sequence 
number equal to one. And second one from node B 
with distance equal to 2 and sequence number equal 
to two. Node A will compare the sequence number of Charusheela Pandit et al Int. Journal of Engineering Research and Applications          www.ijera.com 
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both  messages.  Later  has  most  recent  sequence 
number. Hence node A will update its routing table 
and changes its distance to node E from 3 to 2. 
Route Maintenance 
When  node  finds  the  broken  link,  it 
increments sequence number by 1, so that, sequence 
number  will  be  the  odd  number.  It  sets  the  metric 
value to infinity and advertises the packet. 
 
C. Hybrid Protocols 
Hybrid  routing  protocols  inherits  the 
potency of both protocols (Reactive and Proactive). It 
reduces the routing overhead of proactive protocols 
and decreases the latency of reactive protocols. The 
Zone  Routing  Protocol  or  ZRP  is  the  first  hybrid 
routing  protocol.  ZRP  segregate  the  topology  in 
zones.  The  radius  whose  value  is  equal  to  the 
parametric value X which is equal to the number of 
hops  decides  the  size  of  zone.  ZRP’s  structure  is 
modular, as different protocols are used within and 
between the zones depending on their advantages and 
disadvantages. Proactive protocols are used inside the 
zone so that nodes have uniform routing information 
about  each  node  within  the  zone.  Due  to  this, 
communication of the nodes within the zone is faster, 
reducing  the  latency.  However,  inter-zone  routing 
uses reactive protocols. This reduces the need of each 
node to have fresh information about entire network. 
[1] 
 
III.  Security Vulnerabilities of MANET 
Mobile  Ad-hoc  network  is  far  more 
vulnerable  than  traditional  wired  network.  Hence 
security  maintenance  of  Ad-hoc  network  is  much 
more  difficult.  MANET  is  vulnerable  to  the 
following attacks: 
Attacks in the MANET can be classified as 
  Passive Attacks 
  Active Attacks 
  External Attacks 
  Internal Attacks 
 
A. Passive Attacks 
Passive attack does not disturb the network 
operation.  It  is  used  to  steal  the  confidential 
information from the targeted network. Examples of 
passive attacks are eavesdropping attacks and traffic 
analysis attacks. 
1. Passive Eavesdropping: Eavesdropping is the 
attack,  where  attacker  listen  the  communication 
between nodes throughout the network. The attacker 
will try to obtain secrete information about network 
(like public key, private key, passwords and location) 
which is important to settle the authenticity of nodes. 
This  information  should  be  kept  out  of  reach  of 
unauthorized users. [13] 
2. Traffic Analysis Attack: It is used against the 
internet encryption. It analyse the type of information 
(chat, email, web page request) being communicated 
even if it in encrypted form or scrambled. This attack 
is more effective against encrypted proxies. 
 
B. Active Attack 
Active attack intentionally alters the data to 
disturb the operation of the network. The examples of 
active  attack  are  message  modification,  message 
fabrication and denial of service. 
1. Message Modification: A malicious node will 
try to modify the fields of protocol. 
2.  Message  Fabrication:  Fabrication  attack 
refers to generating false routing messages. 
3. Denial of Service attack (DOS): In denial of 
service  attack,  the  malicious  node  consumes  the 
bandwidth  of  a  network  by  repeatedly  propagating 
request  package  to  target  node.  This  exhausts  the 
processing  power  of  target  and  consumes  the 
resources  (storage  capacity,  processing  power, 
computation resources) available by target. 
4 Active Interfering: Active interfering attack is 
attack  where  attacker  jams  the  radio  signals, 
distorting  the  communication.  As  communication 
channels are blocked nodes cannot forward or receive 
packets. This gives an effect of broken link and nodes 
have to search for another path to communicate. This 
is special type of Daniel of service attack. 
5.  Gray  Hole  Attack:  In  Gray  hole  attack, 
initially malicious node behaves normally i.e. during 
route discovery. But, as soon as it starts receiving the 
data  packets  it  begins  dropping  it.  Sometimes 
attacker node behaves normally while forwarding the 
data  packet,  whereas  sometimes  it  behaves 
maliciously by dropping the data packets. 
 
C. Internal Attack 
A node, which a part of network performs 
malicious task that affects the overall functioning of 
network badly, then it, is called as internal attack. 
1.  Internal  Black  Hole  Attack:  In  black  hole 
attack, a malicious node will claim that it has freshest 
and shortest path to the destination without referring 
to the routing table. In this way attacker node will 
always reply to the route request and thus intercept 
the data packet and retain it. 
2.  Rushing  Attack:  The  node  sends  request 
packet to its entire neighbor. Out of these neighbor if 
one node is compromised node then it will forward 
the  route  request  packet  without  authenticating  the 
sender as soon as possible. So, that it can get entry in 
the  network.  Rushing  attack  is  difficult  to  identify 
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Fig.5 Rushing Attack 
 
From fig. 5 source node S has send message 
to  node  A  and  R.  Node  R  will  rush  the  message 
received from S to D without authenticating S. 
3. Sybil Attack: Sybil attack represents multiple 
identities  for  malicious  intent.  From  fig.  6  node  A 
forwards  the  packet  to  its  neighbours  e.g.  node  B, 
node C, and node M. If node M is compromised node 
it will represents M1, M2, M3 nodes giving illusion to 
node A that it has 6 neighbours instead of 3. 
 
Fig.6 Sybil Attack 
 
D. External Attack 
When external node forcefully tries to be the 
part of network and performs malevolent behaviour, 
then it is called as external attack. 
1. External Black hole Attack: In external black 
hole  attack,  attacker  will  deny  the  access  to  the 
network with the help of denial of service attack or 
by  congestion  in  the  network  or  by  disturbing  the 
entire network. 
 
Fig.7 External Black Hole Attack 
 
2. Impersonation: As there is low level of trust 
among  the  nodes  of  the  MANET,  the  adversary 
captures few nodes from the network. Initially these 
nodes behave as gentle node. When they get entered 
in  the  network  they  start  performing  malicious 
behaviour e.g. propagating fake routing information, 
grab the improper priority to access unauthorized or 
confidential data. 
3.  Wormhole  Attack:  In  Wormhole  attack, 
malicious  nodes  are  at  strategic  position  in  the 
network with shortest path among themselves. These 
nodes advertise this shortest path among themselves 
in the network. They create tunnel between them so 
that  data  is  received  at  one  end  of  the  tunnel  and 
diverted  to  another  position  of  the  network  from 
other part of tunnel. 
 
Fig.8 Wormhole Attack 
 
From above fig.8 node S is source node and 
node  D  is  destination  node.  Node  M  and  N  has 
created tunnel and diverted the received data. 
4.  Jellyfish  Attack:  Jellyfish  attack  refers  to 
creating delay in the network. In this attack, attacker 
first get access to the network and becomes part of it. 
As  it  starts  getting  the  packets  it  delays  its 
forwarding.  This  introduces  delay  in  the  network. 
Once delay gets propagated in the network packets 
are  released.  This  affects  the  performance  of 
networks, increases end-to-end delay, increases jitter 
delay. 
Table  1  describes  the  stack  of  attacks  at 
different layers of network. 
 
TABLE 1 Possible Attacks at Different Layers of 
Network [2] 
Network Layer  Possible Attacks 
Application Layer  Malicious code, Repudiation 
Transport Layer  Session hijacking, Flooding 
Network Layer  Sybil,  Flooding,  Black  Hole, 
Grey Hole.  Worm Hole, Link 
Spoofing,  Link  Withholding, 
Location disclosure etc. 
Data Link/MAC  Malicious  Behavior,  Selfish 
Behavior,  Active,  Passive, 
Internal External 
Physical  Interference, Traffic Jamming, 
Eavesdropping 
 
IV.  Security Objectives of MANET 
MANET  is  weak  to  many  attacks.  To 
maintain the safety of data or message the following 
security objectives needed to achieve. 
 
A.  Availability 
The term availability means node should be 
able to provide services as and when required. The 
denial-of-service  attack  can  affect  the  services 
provided by node. By repeatedly generating the route 
request malicious node exhaust the processing power 
of  target  and  make  the  services  provided  by  it 
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A. INTEGRITY 
Means that the information is not modified 
or  corrupted  by  unauthorized  users  or  by  the 
environment. Integrity guarantees the identity of the 
messages when they are transmitted. Integrity can be 
compromised  mainly  in  two  ways  [3]:  Malicious 
altering and Accidental altering. 
 
B. CONFIDENTIALITY 
Confidentiality  means  secrecy. 
Confidentiality can be gained only when the certain 
data  can  be  accessed  by  authorized  people.  Other 
elements of the networks should not have privilege to 
access it. 
 
C. AUTHENTICITY 
Authenticity  checks  that  the  participating 
node is genuine one, not the impersonator. As there is 
less authenticity among nodes, adversary will make 
few nodes in the network to propagate fake routing 
information disturbing the operation of the network. 
 
D. AUTHORIZATION 
Authorization  assigns  permissions  and 
privileges  to  nodes  to  services  of  the  network. 
Authorization  process  is  done  with  the  help  of 
certificate authority. Different access rights are given 
to  different  user  at  different  levels.  The  network 
administrator  has  access  to  entire  network 
management function. 
 
E. NON REPUDIATION 
To  repudiate  means  deny.  So,  non 
repudiation  does  not  allow  any  node  to  deny  any 
action i.e. any message it has send or received. It is 
basically  useful  when  we  want  to  identify  whether 
the node is normal node or compromised node. Any 
node can take help of erroneous message which it has 
received to declare any node as malicious node. Non 
repudiation can be obtained using digital signature. 
 
F. ANONYMITY 
Anonymity  means  that  all  the  information 
that can be used to identify the owner or the current 
user of the node should default be kept private and 
not  be  distributed  by  the  node  itself  or  the  system 
software. This criterion is closely related to privacy 
preserving,  in  which  we  should  try  to  protect  the 
privacy of the nodes from arbitrary disclosure to any 
other entities. [4] 
 
G. SCALABILITY 
Scalability is not directly related to security 
but it is very important issue that has a great impact 
on security services. An ad hoc network may consist 
of  hundreds  or  even  thousands  of  nodes.  Security 
mechanisms should be scalable to handle such a large 
network. [4] 
 
V.  Secure Ad Hoc Routing Protocols 
To allow data/request packet to travel throughout 
the network safely, it should be keep safe from all 
network attacks so that the security objectives of the 
network  will  be  achieved.  There  are  many  routing 
protocols  that  identify  compromised  nodes  and 
establishes secure path for packets to travel. Some of 
the secure routing protocols are discussed below: 
A.  Securing Ad Hoc Routing Protocols [5] 
Securing Ad hoc Routing Protocols are used to 
secure the routing packets of AODV. 
The  request  messages  are  sent  directly  to  the 
immediate  neighbor,  where  they  are  processed, 
modified  and  resent.  As  a  part  of  processing  the 
intermediate  node  may  modify  their  routing  tables. 
So, intermediate nodes need to check the authenticity 
of the information in the request message. 
In this paper it is mentioned that there are two 
types  information  in  request  message:  mutable  and 
non mutable. Hop count is the mutable information 
and all other information in request message comes 
under non-mutable. Hash chain is used to secure hop 
count and non mutable fields are authenticated using 
digital signature. In this paper the signature extension 
is suggested, that is transmitted with AODV message, 
which contains the information about hash chain and 
digital  signature.  Hash  chain  prevents  unauthorized 
modification of hop count whereas digital signature is 
used at node level to authenticate the receiver. 
 
Fig.  [9]  RREQ  and  RREP  Signature 
Extensions 
 
If intermediate node has higher destination 
sequence number in its routing table than destination 
sequence  in  RREQ  packet  then  intermediate  node 
uses RREQ Double Signature Extension to process 
the RREQ packet. 
Protocol  is  vulnerable  to  tunneling  attack 
due to two consecutive compromised nodes. 
 
B.  SEAD [6] 
A Secure Efficient Distance Vector Routing 
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Destination  Sequenced  Distance  Vector  routing 
protocol. In this paper Message Authentication Code 
(MAC) is used to authenticate the neighbor node and 
one-way  hash  chain  is  used  to  authenticate  routing 
updates.  Due  to  one-way  hash  chain  any  node  can 
only  increase  the  metric  in  the  routing  update  but 
cannot decrease it. Each node generates list of hash 
chain h0, h1, h2… hn where x=h0 x Є {0, 1}p, where 
p  is  length  of  bits  of  the  output  of  hash  function. 
Initially node generates values from left to right as 
shown  above.  But  while  using  these  values,  node 
progresses from right to left i.e. if node knows hi-3 it 
can authenticate hi by H(H(H(hi-3))) and validate this 
result  with  hi.  Node  includes  hash  value  in  each 
routing  update.  When  node  has  routing  update  it 
includes  destination  address,  sequence  number, 
metric, and hash value which is equal to the hash of 
the hash value it has received from the routing update 
entry for that destination. When a node receives the 
routing  update  it  authenticate  each  entry  in  that 
update with the help of destination address, sequence 
number, metric and hash value. The node hashes the 
received  hash  values  correct  number  of  times  to 
check the values with prior authentic value. If a value 
matches it concludes that routing update is authentic. 
This  paper  increases  the  overhead  on 
network  due  to  increased  number  of  routing 
advertisements and due to increased in size of each 
advertisement from the addition of the hash value on 
each entry for authentication. 
 
C.  Mitigating Routing Misbehaviour in Mobile Ad 
Hoc Netwoks [7] 
This  paper  is  based  on  Dynamic  Source 
Routing (DSR). It has introduced two extensions to 
DSR to diminish the effects of misbehaving nodes: 
the watchdog and the pathrater. 
The watchdog detects the malicious nodes. 
It  is  implemented  by  maintaining  the  cache.  As 
shown  in  fig.  [10]  node  A  maintains  cache  of  all 
recently send packets. It checks whether node C has 
received  those  packets  i.e.  whether  node  B  has 
forwarded the packets or not. As packet is received 
by node C respective packet will get removed from 
node  A’s  cache.  If  particular  packet  remain  in  the 
node  A  cache  for  longer  time  than  certain  timeout 
then failure tally of node B will incremented by one. 
If failure tally of node B crosses the threshold value 
then node B will be declared as malicious node. 
 
 
Fig. [10] Watchdog Implementation 
 
Each  node  runs  the  pathrater  and  each  node 
knows the rating of every other node in the network. 
Pathrater assigns 0.5 rating to every node discovered 
during route discovery. It increases the rating of each 
node by 0.01 after every 200ms. If node is found as 
malicious  node  then  its  rating  get  reduce  by  0.05. 
Pathrater  calculates  path  metric  and  path  with  the 
highest path metric is selected. 
This  protocol  cannot  deal  with  colluding 
attack i.e. if node C does not forward the packet but 
node  B  does  not  report  node  A.  If  some  node  has 
temporarily  performed  malfunctioned  (i.e.  due  to 
broken link does not able forward the packet) it gets 
excluded from the network for longer time. 
 
D. ES-AODV[8] 
The  Effective  Secure  AODV  algorithm  is 
used  to  find  the  malicious  node  free  path  than 
shortest path. In this paper each node has got some 
unique value to define the level of trustworthiness of 
a node over another called as trust level. The basic 
idea  behind  this  protocol  is  that  each  intermediate 
node modifies route request packet by appending the 
trust level and IP address of its predecessor and by 
increasing the cumulative ES field by trust value of 
its predecessor and then broadcast that packet. The 
structure of route request packet is shown in fig.11. 
After broadcasting, predecessor verifies if node had 
appended correct value or not to ensure information 
authenticity.  Otherwise  predecessor  sends  warning 
message questioning malicious action of a node. The 
final  route  selection  is  based  on  maximum 
Cumulative Trust Level. The destination selects the 
path with maximum Cumulative Trust Level. If more 
than one packet has same trust-level than hop count is 
used in selecting the path. 
 
Fig. [11] Route Request Packet Structure in ES-
AODV 
 
In this paper modified RREQ packet can be 
received by the next node as predecessor checks the 
authenticity  of  its  successor  after  it  broadcast  the 
RREQ  packet.  This  increases  the  overhead  on 
network  as  it  need  to  compute  the  trust  level  and 
signature of its successor. It can face the Newcomer 
attacks (NCA). 
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E.  Trust Level Evaluation for Communication 
Paths in MANETs by Using Attribute 
Certificates[9]  
This paper has offline phase where the trust 
value  of  each  node  is  calculated.  The  node  whose 
trust level is calculated is called as calculated node 
and node who is calculating the trust level is called as 
calculating  node.  The  calculating  node  gives  trust 
value information to calculated node in the form of 
Attribute Certificate (AC). 
 
Fig. [12] Structure of AC: AC Issued From Node A 
to Node B 
 
From fig. 4 Node A puts all elements of AC 
into hash function to get hash value and attaches the 
value  as  digital  signature.  The  calculated  node  can 
verify the  AC if  it has the  valid public  key of the 
calculating node. The calculated node can verify the 
public key of calculating node with the help of chain 
of PKCs. 
The  source  node  performs  the  route 
discovery  for the particular  destination. The source 
node has to decide the most trustworthy path. When 
intermediate  node  receives  the  RREP  packet  it 
attaches holding AC. Each intermediate node attaches 
the top three ACs to the RREP. Source node verifies 
all received AC and selects the path with highest trust 
metric. 
The  proposed  solution  in  this  paper 
increases the network overhead as size of each AC is 
145 bytes & size of RREP packet is 1500 bytes, so, it 
can accommodate only 10 ACs (i.e. of 3 intermediate 
nodes).    As  hop  count  increases,  more  RREP  will 
require  for  single  path.  Overhead  on  source  node 
increases as it has to verify the PKCs for each AC to 
authenticate the public key in AC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VI.  Comparison of Routing Protocols 
A. Our Contribution:  
Table 2 Comparison of Standard Routing Protocols 
  AODV  DSR  DSDV 
Routing Scheme  Reactive  Reactive  Proactive 
Routing  Information 
Container 
Routing Table  Routing Cache  Routing Table 
Request Packet Size  Fixed  Depends  on  number  of 
intermediate nodes 
Fixed 
Routing Advertisement  On demand  On demand  Periodic and triggered 
Loop Free  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Path Decision On  Hop  count  and  sequence 
number 
Hop count  Sequence number 
Route Maintenance  Entry  gets  deleted  after 
time expiration 
If  packet  not  received, 
sends  error  message  to 
source 
Increments  sequence 
number  by  1  and 
advertises  with  infinite 
metric 
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B. Our Contribution:  
Table 3 Comparison of Secure Routing Protocol on The Basis of Security Aspects 
  Securing 
AODV [5] 
SEAD [6]  Mitigating 
Routing 
Misbehaviour 
in  Mobile  Ad 
Hoc  Networks 
[7] 
ES-AODV[8]  Trust  Level 
Evaluation  for 
Communication 
Paths  in  MANETs 
by Using Attribute 
Certificates[9] 
Routing Scheme  AODV  DSDV  DSR  AODV  SMR 
Attack 
Vulnerability 
Cannot  deal 
with 
Warmhole 
Attack 
Cannot deal with 
colluding 
Cannot  deal 
with colluding 
May  face 
Newcomer 
Attack 
Gray Hole Attack 
Authentication 
Scheme 
One-Way 
Hash  Chain, 
Digital 
Signature 
One-Way  Hash 
Chain  and 
Message 
Authentication 
Code 
Watchdog, 
Pathrater 
Trust  Levels, 
Message 
Authentication 
Code 
Trust  Levels, 
Digital Signature 
Drawbacks  Cannot 
evaluate 
previous 
hash value 
Temporary 
malfunctioned 
nodes  are 
removed  from 
network  for 
longer time 
Increases 
network 
overhead, more 
latency 
Routing 
packets  are 
forwarded  to 
neighbours 
without  
checking  its 
authenticity 
More 
authentication 
overhead  on 
source,  more 
number  RREP 
require,  if 
intermediate  nodes 
are more 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
There  are  various  drawback  of  MANET  like 
continuous  mobility  of  nodes  which  may  result  in 
frequent changes in topology,  lack of infrastructure 
makes  the  MANET  weaker  to  handle  various 
network  attacks.  This  paper  has  covered  maximum 
network attacks and traditional routing protocol. This 
paper  has  emphasized  on  few  secure  routing 
protocols  and  its  comparison  with  respect  to  its 
security  issue.  Additionally  it  provides  the 
comparison of few traditional routing protocols. 
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